





The paper aims at extending the egalitarian principle to environments with
incomplete information. The approach is primarily axiomatic, focusing on the
characteristic property of monotonicity: no member of the society should be worse
o when more collective decisions are available. I start by showing the incompat-
ibility of this property with incentive eciency, even in quasi-linear environments.
This serious impossibility result does not follow from the mere presence of incentive
constraints, but instead from the fact that information is incomplete (asymmetric
information at the time of making a decision). I then weaken the monotonicity
property so as to require it only when starting from incentive compatible mecha-
nisms at which interim utilities are transferable (in a weak sense). Adding other
axioms in the spirit of Kalai's (Econometrica, 1977, Theorem 1) classical character-
ization of the egalitarian principle under complete information, I obtain a partial
characterization of a natural extension of the lex-min solution to problems with
incomplete information. Next, I prove that, in each social choice problem, there is
a unique way of rescaling the participants' interim utilities so as to make this solu-
tion compatible with the ex-ante utilitarian principle. These two criteria coincides
in the rescaled utilities exactly at the incentive ecient mechanisms that maxi-
mize Harsanyi and Selten's (Management Science, 1972) weighted Nash product.
These concepts are illustrated on classical examples of prot-sharing, public good
production and bilateral trade. The richness of the topic of social choice under in-
complete information is illustrated by considering two alternative extensions of the
egalitarian principle { one based on an idea of equity from the point of view of the
individuals themselves (given their private information) instead of an uninformed
third party (social planner or arbitrator), and another notion based on the idea of
procedural justice.
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11. INTRODUCTION
The theory of social choice has been applied extensively to determine collective ac-
tions. A limitation to its applicability, though, is the prevalent assumption of complete
information. Indeed, in many practical scenarios, the participants already have some
private information when making a collective decision. Developing models of cooperation
under incomplete information has long been considered, and remains a signicant open
problem in economic theory, as pointed out, for instance, by Professor Aumann in his
presidential address to the Game Theory Society (reproduced in Aumann, 2003). To
be more precise, an impressive amount of work has already been devoted to understand
which contracts are feasible under asymmetric information. Professors Hurwicz, Maskin,
and Myerson were awarded the 2007 Sveriges riksbank prize in economic sciences in mem-
ory of Alfred Nobel for their path-breaking early contributions on the topic. Yet, little
work has been done to identify contracts that are socially desirable among those that
are feasible. Instead, researchers have devoted their eort to characterizing equilibrium
outcomes of specic non-cooperative games (see e.g. the literatures on auctions, cheap
talk, and contracts). I nd that extending the theory of social choice to characterize selec-
tion criteria that would be applicable to the mechanism design problem is an important
research agenda.
As a rst step in that direction, the present paper discusses possible extensions of the
egalitarian principle to environments with asymmetric information. The approach will
be primarily axiomatic, focusing on the characteristic property of monotonicity, which is
as straightforward under asymmetric information as it is under complete information: no
member of the society should be worse o (whatever his or her private information) when
more collective decisions are available.1 In quasi-linear environments under complete in-
formation, the egalitarian solution { selecting the collective decision that maximizes the
sum of the gains and designing monetary compensations so as to equalize those gains
across individuals { is monotonic and systematically selects an outcome that is Pareto
ecient. These two basic properties { Eciency and Monotonicity { will be shown to be-
come incompatible under incomplete information (Theorem 1). This impossibility result
does not follow from the mere presence of incentive constraints, but instead from the fact
that information is incomplete (asymmetric information at the time of selecting a collec-
tive decision). Indeed, no such impossibility would occur in quasi-linear environments if
decisions about what to implement at the interim stage were made at the ex-ante stage,
i.e. before the individuals learn their private information, or if asymmetric information
involved moral hazard instead of adverse selection.
1Monotonicity properties of this type have a long tradition in the theories of social choice, distributive
justice, and bargaining. First brie
y discussed in the books of Luce and Raia (1957, pages 133 and 134)
and Owen (1968), they have been systematically studied since then under the assumption of complete
information, cf. Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975), Kalai (1977), Thomson and Myerson (1980), Kalai and
Samet (1985), Young (1985a, 85b), Moulin and Thomson (1988), and Moulin (1992), to cite only a few
references that illustrate the variety of environments where it has been studied. Monotonicity is also
necessary to provide individuals with incentives to search for new protable collective decisions, and to
divulge these new options in all circumstances.
2Eciency and Monotonicity are also incompatible under complete information in the
absence of \transferable utilities" (this is known at least since Luce and Raia (1957)). It
is helpful to understand why. Consider a rst problem where only one collective decision,
d, is available to replace the status-quo, and assume further that the rst participant is
indierent between the alternative and the status-quo, while the second strictly prefers
the former. Eciency will guide the social planner or the arbitrator in selecting the
alternative over the status-quo. Consider then a second problem that is symmetric to
the rst, in that only one collective decision, d0, is available to replace the status-quo,
with the property that the second participant is indierent between the alternative and
the status-quo, while the rst strictly prefers the former. Again, eciency will guide the
social planner or the arbitrator in selecting the alternative over the status-quo. Let then
the third problem be the union of the rst two: any lottery selecting either d or d0 is
feasible. Clearly, there is no way to solve uniquely that new problem so as to make both
player 1 better o than with the solution to the second problem, and player 2 better o
than with the solution to the rst problem. It has long been understood that this kind
of impossibility is due to an extreme lack of utility transferability (e.g. starting from d,
there is no alternative decision in the rst problem that would allow to make player 1
strictly better o, even if one is ready to make the second individual worse o in any
amount). A usual way to deal with this complication is actually to avoid it altogether by
restricting the class of acceptable social choice problems. A classical example is Moulin's
(1988, Theorem 3.2) textbook presentation of Kalai's (1977, Theorem 1) now classical
axiomatic characterization of the egalitarian solution,2 where social choice problems are
assumed to satisfy a property of \minimal transferability,"3 meaning that, at any feasible
contract that is ecient and individually rational, and for any individual i, there exists
an alternative feasible option that makes all the other individuals better o (thereby at
the expense of i).4 In particular, it rules out the possibility of satiation.
Theorem 1 thus also shows that restricting the class of social choice problems is not
anymore a practical way to resolve the incompatibility of Eciency and Monotonicity un-
der incomplete information, as this incompatibility already occurs on the very restrictive
class of quasi-linear social choice problems (i.e. with unlimited one-to-one transferabil-
ity ex-post). The reason is that incentive constraints may lead to feasible sets of interim
utilities that are non-comprehensive (for instance, a type of an individual may beneciate
of an \informational rent" in any incentive ecient mechanism) and with the possibility
of satiation, even in the simplest quasi-linear environments. The complexity of how in-
centive constraints may in
uence the shape of the feasible sets of utilities at the interim
2To be precise, Kalai actually characterized the proportional solutions in his original paper, but of
course the egalitarian solution is the only one to be anonymous in that class.
3Kalai's original result only required free disposal, which is weaker than the property of minimal
transferability, but at the cost of accommodating only a weak form of Pareto eciency, which is not very
appealing, especially in social choice theory.
4Though not explicit in its name, the usual notion of transferable utility in cooperative games (or of
quasi-linearity in the previous paragraph) requires in addition that, starting from any contract, utilities
can be transferred at a constant rate of one to one. Minimal transferability is thus far weaker, to a point
that it is almost unrelated.
3stage is a diculty that will be present throughout the paper, implying that axiomatic
results are denitely more challenging to derive than under complete information.
As a variant to the domain restriction, Theorem 1's impossibility will be avoided by
weakening the monotonicity property in a similar spirit. I will say that interim utilities
are5 \transferable" at an incentive compatible mechanism  if for any two participants
i;j, and any possible pair of types, ti for i and tj for j, there exists an alternative incentive
compatible mechanism  that is better than  for i when of type ti, worse than  for j
of type tj, and at least as good as  for any combination of participant and type that is
dierent from (i;ti) and (j;tj). The axiom of \Restricted Monotonicity" (R-MON) is then
the monotonicity property applied only when starting from a mechanism at which interim
utilities are transferable. A social planner or an arbitrator may feel very constrained at
a mechanism where interim utilities are not transferable because he would like to pick
an alternative mechanism that is more favorable to individual i, when of type ti, at the
expense of individual j, when of type tj, but cannot do so because of the incentive and the
feasibility constraints. In such cases, having more collective decisions available may soften
this constraint, and result in a mechanism that is less favorable to individual j of type
tj. I am not claiming that monotonicity should systematically be violated when adding
collective decisions to a problem whose solution is a mechanism at which interim utilities
are not transferable. Instead I am arguing that these are cases where monotonicity might
be problematic and less appealing. R-MON thus remains silent in those dubious cases.
R-MON is compatible with Holmstr om and Myerson's (1983) notion of incentive ef-
ciency (I-EFF). In Section 5, I will introduce additional axioms in the spirit of Kalai
(1977, Theorem 1) in order to extend his characterization of the egalitarian principle to
problems with incomplete information. Anonymity requires that renaming individuals
and/or their types should have a covariant impact on the solution of any problem. Most
of the theory of social choice under complete information (including Kalai's result, of
course) is phrased under the welfarist assumption that only feasible utilities matter, not
the underlying decisions that make them feasible.6 Though it is certainly worthwile to
nd more primitive properties to justify that assumption,7 or to study context-dependent
social choice functions that violate it,8 I feel that it is more natural to start by trying to
extend the most standard approach to frameworks under incomplete information before
nding interesting ways of departing from the benchmark. Understanding what is the
right notion of welfarism under incomplete information is not that obvious in itself. A
rst idea that may come to mind is to require that only the sets of utility vectors that
are feasible ex-post (i.e. one set for each possible realization of the types), should be
sucient information to determine the solution. This approach is necessarily wrong, as
5Again, transferability here should not be confused with its narrow meaning in cooperative games
under complete information - cf. footnote 4.
6This welfarist assumption that remains implicit in the way classical models are phrased was rst
emphasized by Roemer (1986).
7In the context of social choice under complete information, see e.g. Moulin (1985), Roemer (1986),
Gines and Marhuenda (2000), and de Clippel and Bejan (2009).
8Cf., for instance, the concepts of envy-freeness (Foley (1967), Varian (1974), and Feldman and
Kirman (1974)) and egalitarian equivalence (Pazner and Schmeidler (1978)).
4it does not allow to keep track of incentive constraints. Indeed, the fact that a utility
vector is feasible at some type prole does not allow to infer what would be the utility
that an individual would get should he report a dierent type. Also, only interim prefer-
ences matter when taking a decision alone under incomplete information, and therefore
one may take the position that interim data should be sucient as well when taking
a collective decision. This motivates the addition of an axiom of \Interim Welfarism"
(I-WELF): if the set of interim utilities that can be generated via incentive compatible
mechanisms is the same in two social choice problems, then the set of interim utilities
that can be generated by the mechanisms in the solution should be the same for both
problems. Also, it is often understood in a welfarist model that any feasible option that
leads to the same utilities as an element in the solution should be a valid choice as well.
This property will now be imposed explicitly under the name of \Exhaustivity" (EX).
Theorem 2 then shows that these axioms { I-EFF, R-MON, AN, I-WELF, and EX { oer
a partial characterization of a natural extension of the egalitarian principle9 to problems
with incomplete information, which I call the interim lex-min solution. Given a social
choice problem, one may compute the interim utility for every type of every individual
associated to any given incentive compatible mechanism. After ranking these utilities in-
creasingly, the interim lex-min solution then picks the mechanism that maximizes these
vectors of interim utilities according to the lexicographic ordering. Theorem 2' provides
a variant of Theorem 2 that proves more useful in some applications. Details are deferred
to the main text.
Interpersonal comparisons of interim utilities come as a consequence of the axioms, of
course as it does under complete information. I react in three ways to this fact. First I
apply the new criterion to quasi-linear examples (sharing the prot of a collectively-owned
technology, sharing the cost of production of a public good, and determining the fair price
in a bilateral trade problem). Interpersonal comparisons are indeed easiest to accept in
the presence of a numeraire. Many examples in mechanism design already fall in that
category, because quasi-linearity simplies a bit the often-dicult task of characterizing
incentive ecient mechanisms. Second, I pursue Harsanyi's (1963) methodology (see
also Shapley (1969) and Yaari (1981)) of endogenizing interpersonal comparisons so as
to reconcile the utilitarian and the egalitarian principles. Here I aim at combining the
ex-ante utilitarian criterion (which is often considered informally as a natural extension of
the utilitarian criterion to the interim stage; see Nehring (2004) for a rst formal argument
in that direction) and my interim egalitarian criterion by rescaling the interim utilities.
Interestingly, it turns out (see Theorem 2) that this is always feasible, even while requiring
the interim egalitarian criterion to hold with equality (no need to resort to the lex-min
renement), it leads to a unique solution, and results in a characterization of Myerson's
9The basic meaning of egalitarianism under complete information is often understood as choosing an
option that is Pareto ecient and that equalizes the individuals' utility gains. Yet, it is obvious that such
options are not always available - cf. the description of the equality/eciency dilemma in Moulin (1988,
Chapter 1). Actually, it is precisely in those cases that the property of monotonicity may be violated.
The usual adaptation of the basic principle, so as to apply in all problems, is to maximize a lex-min
ordering. The interim lex-min is thus a natural extension of that workable version of the egalitarian
principle to frameworks involving incomplete information.
5(1979) solution, maximizing Harsanyi and Selten's (1972) weighted Nash product over the
set of interim utilities that are achievable through some incentive compatible mechanism
(see Weidner (1992), for a direct axiomatic characterization of that solution under the
assumption of independent types). Third, in a companion paper (de Clippel et al., 2010),
the solution is applied to utility gains that are measured endogenously in a way that
extends Pazner and Schmeidler's (1978) concept of egalitarian equivalence to economies
under asymmetric information. Though we do not have an axiomatic characterization of
that variant, it has the advantage of being ordinally invariant, and applicable to rational
preference orderings that do not necessarily satisfy the expected utility hypothesis.
I hope that the present paper will serve as a benchmark for future work in social
choice under incomplete information. I see the interim lex-min solution as the most
straightforward extension of the egalitarian principle. While it does capture obvious
equity considerations { viz. the uninformed third party (social planner or arbitrator)
trying to make sure that all the individuals enjoy the same expected benets given their
own private information, and this whatever the actual prole of types { I believe that there
might be alternative appealing ways to proceed. To illustrate the potential richness of the
topic of social choice under incomplete information, I suggest in the concluding section
two other routes to derive natural extensions of the egalitarian principle, and show by
means of examples how they dier in their prescriptions. In the rst approach, I propose
to place a higher weight on the individuals' knowledge at the interim stage to determine
what is equitable. Indeed, it will become clear after studying some examples that, even
though mechanisms in the interim lex-min solution are equitable from the point of view
of an uninformed third party, some individuals may feel, given the private information
they happen to have, that the outcome of these mechanisms is actually biased in favor
of some other individuals. This motivates another possible extension of egalitarianism
in quasi-linear collective choice problems that selects the incentive ecient mechanisms
that maximize the minimum of the type-agents' ratios between their expected utility
gains and the total surplus they expect the mechanism to realize. In a second approach,
I discuss brie
y the procedural approach to equity and distributive justice. We will see
that the equivalence between the egalitarian principle and the equilibrium outcome of
the random dictatorship procedure in quasi-linear problems with risk-neutral individuals
does not survive the presence of asymmetric information.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The related literature is discussed in the
next section. Section 3 denes the general model and notations. The incompatibility of I-
EFF and MON in quasi-linear problems is presented in Section 4. I introduce the interim
lex-min solution in Section 5, and present the two partial axiomatic characterizations
involving R-MON and I-WELF. In Section 6, I show how there is a unique way to
rescale the individuals' interim utilities so as to make the ex-ante utilitarian principle
compatible with my interim egalitarian principle, leading to a new characterization of
Myerson's (1979) variant of Harsanyi and Selten's (1972) solution. Some applications in
quasi-linear environments are analyzed in Section 7. Alternative criteria and subjects of
re
ection for further research in social choice under incomplete information are presented
in Section 8.
62. RELATION TO THE LITERATURE
I am aware of very few papers directly studying social choice criteria under incomplete
information from an axiomatic perspective. Nehring (2004) studies interim social welfare
orderings that allow to compare proles of ex-post utilities. He shows that two axioms
of consistency, one with the interim Pareto criterion and the other with uniform ex-
post utilitarian comparisons, are compatible if and only if the individuals' beliefs can
be derived from a common prior. In addition, the only interim social welfare ordering
that satises these two axioms when a common prior exists, is the ex-ante utilitarian
criterion. I show in de Clippel (2010) that Nehring's methodology { extending to the
interim stage classical social welfare orderings by combining ex-post arguments with the
interim Pareto criterion { essentially works only for the utilitarian criterion. Indeed, his
two axioms become incompatible for most common priors once the utilitarian criterion
is replaced by any other social welfare ordering that satises the strict Pigou-Dalton
transfer principle (as does the egalitarian principle, for instance). As a consequence, and
given that the enforceable collective decision is made at the interim stage, I drop the
idea of consistency with ex-post comparisons, and instead try to nd the criterion that
emerges from a direct adaptation of axioms that are known to capture the essence of the
egalitarian principle under complete information. Also, I study social welfare functions
instead of social welfare orderings, and I take into account the incentive constraints
explicitly. Olszewski (2004) characterized Moulin's (1994) serial cost sharing method for
the provision and pricing of excludable public goods. He proves that the serial method
is Pareto dominant within the class of mechanisms that are continuous, individually
rational, coalition strategy-proof, and treats equals equally. Maniquet and Sprumont
(2010) also show that the serial method is the only second-best method (within the class
of strategy-proof mechanisms) that satises an axiom of demand monotonicity (assuming
that there is a large population, that the cost function is convex, and that the quasi-linear
preferences satisfy the single-crossing property). This class of results, and the rule they
characterize, is specic to the problem of provision and pricing of excludable public
goods. The approach I propose in the present paper is applicable to any social choice
problem. Of course, as it is the case under complete information, this comes at the
cost that the analysis cannot be \context-dependent." In particular, the serial method
cannot be phrased in the space of utilities, and hence is ruled out by the axiom of interim
welfarism. Another dierence in methodology is the fact that my arguments are phrased
with Bayesian incentive compatibility constraints instead of strategy-proofness.
There is a small literature on axiomatic bargaining under asymmetric information,
which might be relevant since there is a strong link under complete information between
the theories of bargaining and social choice, the Nash product, for instance, being a fo-
cal criterion in both elds. The rst extension of Nash's bargaining theory is due to
Harsanyi and Selten (1972), who start by discussing which proles of interim utilities are
achievable via demand games, and then, abstracting from the strategies that lead to these
proles of interim utilities, characterize a unique solution which amounts to maximize a
weighted Nash product, where types are weighted according to their marginal likelihood.
Myerson (1979) then argues that their criterion should be maximized over a larger set
7of interim utilities, namely those that can be achieved via incentive compatible mecha-
nisms, as a consequence of the revelation principle. Weidner (1992) reconstructs Harsanyi
and Selten's characterization result of the weighted Nash product on Myerson's domain,
and argues that their result then holds only when the players' types are independently
distributed. Myerson (1984a) takes a radically dierent standpoint, arguing against the
Harsanyi-Selten solution for bargaining problems, independently of the set of interim
utilities over which it is maximized. One of his arguments is that the solution is sensitive
to joint changes of the utility functions and the players' beliefs that nevertheless leave
interim preferences unchanged { formally a violation of his probability-invariance axiom.
So indeed the Harsanyi-Selten solution is not well-dened if it is to be applied to Savage-
type preferences, where beliefs are subjective. This criticism would disappear, though,
in the more restrictive case where uncertainty is objective. Although I have not inves-
tigated this idea carefully from an epistemic perspective, I think that the probabilities
could also be interpreted in the social choice perspective developed in the present paper
as the subjective probability of the uninformed benevolent third party. Notice though
that the interim lex-min solution is not subject to Myerson's criticism, as it does satisfy
his probability invariance axiom (which is implied by my axiom of interim welfarism).
So, in view of Theorem 2, the fact that the Harsanyi-Selten solution violates Myerson's
probability invariance axiom can be traced back to the fact that the ex-ante utilitarian
principle violates it. Another criticism from Myerson (1984a) is that the Harsanyi-Selten
solution does not coincide with the equilibrium outcome of a simple bargaining procedure
when it seems that any bargaining solution should { formally a violation of his random
dictatorship axiom. This argument from non-cooperative behavior makes a lot of sense in
bargaining, especially in the context of the Nash program, but less in social choice. Even
so, I will go back to Myerson's idea in Section 8 to show how a procedural approach to
justice might lead to recommendations that dier from those made by the interim lex-min
solution, or even the variant brie
y discussed at the end of the Introduction, a feature
that is due solely to the presence of asymmetric information. As already mentioned ear-
lier, characterization results are signicantly more dicult to establish under incomplete
information than under complete information because one needs to keep track of incen-
tive constraints and understand how ex-post utilities and beliefs in
uence the shape of
the feasible sets of interim utilities. The virtual utility construction of Myerson's (1984a)
analysis of the bargaining problem will prove very useful in the present paper as well (the
Appendix contains a refresher).
Finally, there exists a slightly more extensive literature whose objective is to com-
pute the optimal mechanism under a given social choice criterion, without discussing the
normative appeal of the criterion itself. Mirrlees (1971) is a rst classic example in that
category. The social objective he follows is to maximize the sum of the agents' utilities (or
a common transformation of those utilities), in the utilitarian tradition. His methodology
has been followed since then in the literature on optimal taxation. In most papers, there
is a large population, which implies that all possible types (representing, for instance, the
agents' productivity or their cost of eort) are present in the population. Classic social
welfare criteria that were dened under complete information can thus be applied success-
8fully, since they all treat individuals anonymously anyway. Another classic paper where
a utilitarian principle is applied to select an incentive compatible mechanism is Myerson
and Satterthwaite's (1983) bilateral trade problem. Here, only two agents are interacting
and only one pair of types (interpreted as reservation prices) is actually realized. The
utilitarian criterion is applied ex-ante, i.e. behind the veil of ignorance and using the
relative likelihood of each possible pair of types. To the best of my knowledge, Nehring's
(2004) result that I discussed earlier is the only existing axiomatic characterization of
that ex-ante utilitarian criterion. There is a more recent literature that is developing at
the intersection of computer science and economics that looks for strategy-proof mecha-
nisms that maximize a worst-case scenario index, in order to guarantee, for instance, a
minimal percentage of the maximal total surplus in every possible realization of the types
(see e.g. Guo and Conitzer, 2009, Moulin, 2009, and references therein). Though intu-
itively appealing, this criterion has not been axiomatically characterized yet. Another
dierence, of course, is that their approach is non-Bayesian. More importantly, we see
that all these contributions focus on the utilitarian principle. The present paper not only
oers an axiomatic discussion of a normative criterion that is applicable in numerous
practical problems, but also suggests an alternative point of view of distributive justice
under incomplete information, focusing on equity instead of some form of sum-eciency.
3. GENERAL MODEL
A social choice problem under incomplete information is a sextuple
S = (I;D;d
;(Ti)i2I;p;(ui)i2I);
where I is the nite set of individuals, D is the set of collective decisions, d 2 D is the
status-quo, Ti is the nite set of individual i's possible types, p 2 (T) is the common
prior determining the individuals' beliefs (where T = i2ITi), and ui : D  T ! R
is individual i's utility function, that will be used to determine his interim preferences
via the expected utility criterion. It will be assumed for notational convenience that
ui(d;t) = 0, for all t 2 T. This is without loss of generality if utilities are understood as
representing gains over the status-quo. I will also assume that T is the only nonempty
common knowledge event. This is without loss of generality, as the results can be applied
over minimal common knowledge events, and then merged so as to apply to the whole
set of type proles.
A (direct) mechanism for S is a function  : T ! (D). If a mechanism  is
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i in Ti and each i 2 I. The revelation principle (Myerson, 1979) implies
that any agreement that is achievable through some form of communication can also be
achieved through truth-telling in an incentive compatible direct mechanism. Hence one
may restrict attention to those mechanisms without loss of generality.
An incentive compatible mechanism  is interim individually rational if Ui(jti)  0,
for all ti 2 Ti and all i 2 I. A mechanism is feasible if it is both incentive compatible
and interim individually rational. The set of feasible mechanisms will be denoted F(S).
Let U(M) be the set of interim utilities that can be achieved via incentive compatible
mechanisms that belong to a set M:
U(M) = fu()j 2 Mg;
where u() = (Ui(jti))ti2Ti;i2I. It is easy to check that U(F(S)) is a convex set, as
rst observed by Myerson (1979). For notational simplicity, I will restrict attention to
social choice problems for which there exists u 2 U(F(S)) such that u >> 0, and for
which U(F(S)) is compact. This last assumption is true whenever D is nite and in
usual applications that involve a continuum of collective decisions, but it is possible to
construct mathematical examples that would violate it.
A social choice function is a correpondence  that associates a nonempty set of feasible
mechanisms to each social choice problem: (S)  F(S), for each S. Even though
correspondences are allowed, it is assumed that a social choice function is essentially
single-valued, in the sense that all the individuals must be indierent (whatever their
private information) between any two mechanisms that belong to the solution of any
problem S = (I;D;d(Ti)i2I;p;(ui)i2I):
(8;
0 2 (S))(8i 2 I)(8ti 2 Ti) : Ui(jti) = Ui(
0jti): (1)
For reference, a social choice problem S = (I;D;d;(Ti)i2I;p;(ui)i2I) is quasi-linear
if there exist a set ^ D and functions ^ ui : ^ D  T ! R (one for each i 2 I) such that
D = ^ D  RI and ui((^ d;m);t) = ^ ui(^ d;t) + mi, for all (^ d;m) 2 ^ D  RI.
4. IMPOSSIBILITY
The purpose of this section is to establish the strong incompatibility, under incomplete
information, of the properties of incentive eciency (Holmstr om and Myerson (1983)) and
monotonicity.
Incentive Eciency (I-EFF) Let S be a social choice problem, and let  2 (S). Then
there does not exist a mechanism ^  2 F(S) such that Ui(^ jti)  Ui(jti), for each ti 2 Ti,
and each i 2 I, with at least one of the inequalities being strict.
Monotonicity (MON) Let S and S0 be two social choice problem. Suppose that S0 diers
10from S only in that more collective decisions are available: I = I0, D  D0, Ti = T 0
i,
and ui(d;t) = u0
i(d;t), for each i 2 I, each d 2 D, and each t 2 T. If  2 (S) and
0 2 (S0), then Ui(0jti)  Ui(jti), for each ti 2 Ti, and each i 2 I.
I-EFF requires the social choice function to systematically exhaust the benet of coop-
eration at the time of agreeing. R-MON means that no individual in the society should
be worse o when more collective decisions become available.
Theorem 1 There is no social choice function that satises both I-EFF and MON, even
on the restricted class of quasi-linear social choice problems.10
Proof: The proof goes by way of example. Consider a social choice problem with two
individuals,11 1 and 2, that can be of two types, L or H. Each individual knowns only
his own type, and believes that the two types of the other individual are equally likely.
Each individual has up to 10 hours available to work, and his productivity per hour is 1
if his type is L, and 2 if his type is H. Allowing for any kind of transfers and free disposal,
the set of decisions is thus
D = f(1;2;m1;m2) 2 [0;10]
2  R
2jm1 + m2  0g
and the utility functions are given by the following expression:
ui((;m);t) = i(ti)i + mi;
for each (;m) 2 D, each i 2 f1;2g and ti 2 fL;Hg, with the convention i(L) = 1 and
i(H) = 2, for each i 2 f1;2g. One may think of each individual cultivating a similar
eld, their payos being the quantity produced on their own eld, which depends on their
productivity, modied by any kind of monetary subsidy and taxes. We will assume that
d = 0.
Let's consider now a feasible mechanism12 (;m) that determines a decision in D
as a function of the individuals' reports.13 The incentive constraints faced by the rst
individual can be written as follows:
 m1(H)    m1(L)   1(L)    1(H) 
 m1(H)    m1(L)
2
(2)
where  1(L) (resp.  1(H)) is the average quantity of time the rst individual thinks he








10The larger the domain, the easier it is to prove an impossibility result. Also, as indicated in the
Introduction, the result is not surprising if one includes social choice problems with a severe lack of
utility transferability. The unexpected character of Theorem 1 is that the impossibility may occur even
in problems with unlimited one-to-one transferability.
11The example extends in a straightforward way to accomodate any number of individuals, but at the
cost of heavier notations. The qualitative results remain unchanged.
12To keep notations lighter, the same letters are used to denote a collective decision, and the mechanism
that selects a collective decisions as a function of the type reports.
13Utilities being linear in both time and money, there is no loss of generality in discussing only deter-
ministic mechanisms.
11and  m1(L) (resp.  m1(H)) is the average quantity of money the rst individual thinks he








Equation (2) implies that  m1(H)   m1(L) and  1(L)   1(H). If the mechanism is
incentive ecient, then it must be that  1(H) = 10. Otherwise, one could construct
another feasible mechanism that interim Pareto dominates (;m) by slightly increasing
both  1(L) and  1(H) by a same amount, while keeping 2 and m unchanged. Notice
also that the second inequality in (2) must be binding if (;m) is incentive ecient.
Indeed, suppose on the contrary that the inequality is strict. Hence  1(L) < 10 (as
otherwise  1(L) =  1(H), and (2) implies that  m1(L) =  m1(H), which contradicts
the fact that the second inequality is strict). Now one can construct another feasible
mechanism that interim Pareto dominates (;m) by increasing a bit  1(L), while keeping
 1(H), 2 and m unchanged. This contradicts the fact that (;m) is incentive ecient,
and thereby proves that (2) is binding. Notice now that  1(L) must equal 10, as well.
Otherwise, consider an alternative mechanism where  1(L) is increased by a small amount
, while keeping  1(H) and  2 constant, and changing monetary transfers as follows:
m(L;L) = m(L;H) = ( ;+) and m(H;L) = m(H;H) = (+; ). Since
 1(L) < 10 and the second inequality of (2) is binding, it must be that the rst inequality
of (2) is strict for the original mechanism. The change makes lying for player 1 a bit more
attractive when of a low type, but not enough for him to actually lie if  is small enough.
The incentive constraint remains binding when he is of a high type. As for player 2,
nothing changes for him, since he ignores player 1's type, and the additional tax of 
when player 1 reports a high type is exactly compensated by the additional subsidy of
 when player 1 reports a low type. In terms of interim payos, both types of both
individuals get at least as much with the new mechanism than with the original one, but
player 1 gets strictly more when of a high type, thereby contradicting the fact that the
original mechanism is incentive ecient. Hence  1(L) =  1(H) = 10, and (2) implies
 m1(L) =  m1(H). A similar reasoning applies to individual 2. Hence, if a mechanism
(;m) is incentive ecient, then there exists (x1;x2) 2 R2 such that x1 + x2 = 0, and
Ui((;m)jL) = 10 + xi and Ui((;m)jH) = 20 + xi;
for i = 1;2. Conversely, any such interim payos can be achieved by an incentive com-
patible mechanism (;m), where i(t) = 10, mi(t) = xi, for each t 2 fL;Hg2 and each
i 2 f1;2g.
Consider now a similar problem, but where the two individuals work on a third eld,
in which case a total productivity of 3 per joint hour of work can be achieved. They
can decide in which proportion the output will be shared, and to implement monetary









2js1 + s2 = 1 and m1 + m2  0g









12for each (0;s;m) 2 D0, each i 2 f1;2g and ti 2 fL;Hg. The status-quo is d = 0.





















Since utilities are independent of the types, incentive constraints imply that the two types
of each agent expects identical utility gains. Hence, if a mechanism (0;s;m0) is incentive
ecient, then there exists (x0
1;x0
2) 2 R2 such that x0
1 + x0









0)jH)  15 + x
0
i;
for i = 1;2. The inequality must in fact be binding, since any such interim payos can be
achieved by an incentive compatible mechanism (0;s;m0), where 0
i(t) = 10, si(t) = 1=2,
m0
i(t) = x0
i, for each t 2 fL;Hg2 and each i 2 f1;2g.
Finally, suppose that the impartial third party can choose to allocate the individuals'










s1 + s2 = 1;1 + 
0
1  10;2 + 
0
2  10, and m1 + m2  0g









for each (;0;s;m) 2 D00, each i 2 f1;2g and ti 2 fL;Hg, with the convention i(L) = 1



















for each (;0;s;m) 2 F(S00), the last equality following from the fact that the maximal
total surplus is 40 when both individuals' type is H and is 30 otherwise. Hence there is
no way to nd a feasible mechanism that gives an interim utility of at least 15 + x0
1 and
15+x0
2 to the low-type individuals, and 20+x1 and 20+x2 to the high-type individuals,
which contradicts MON, since D  D00, D0  D00, and both u00
i(d;t) = ui(d;t), for each
i 2 I, each d 2 D, and each t 2 fL;Hg2, and u00
i(d0;t) = u0
i(d0;t), for each i 2 I, each
d0 2 D0, and each t 2 fL;Hg2. 
I-EFF and MON would not be incompatible in quasi-linear environments under incom-
plete information in the absence of incentive constraints (e.g. as in the case of veriable
information as in Wilson (1978), de Clippel and Minelli (2004) and de Clippel (2007)).
To illustrate this point,14 suppose for instance that the output of both individuals could
14The general argument is left to the reader.
13be observed at no cost in the rst problem described in the proof of Theorem 1, and that
contracts could be made contingent on that observed output. Then the social planner
or the arbitrator could implement a mechanism that requires both individuals to work
for ten hours on their own eld, and for the individual with a high output to pay $10
to the individual with low output (if such a conguration occurs). The resulting interim
utilities are 15 for both types of both individuals, which is also achievable in the last two
problems described in the proof of Theorem 1, and hence I-EFF and MON are compatible
in that example. Though the presence of incentive constraints is an important factor for
the incompatibility of I-EFF and MON, it is important to emphasize the other factor,
which is the presence of incomplete information, i.e. asymmetric information at the time
of making the collective choice. So the tension between I-EFF and MON would disappear
if the collective decision to be implemented at the interim stage was made at the ex-ante
stage (i.e. before the agents learn their private information). To illustrate this point,15
notice indeed that there exists an ex-ante incentive ecient mechanism in each of the
three problems discussed in the proof of Theorem 1 that lead to an expected payo of
$15 to both players, and hence eciency and monotonicity are compatible, even when
incentive constraints are imposed, when considered at the ex-ante stage. Similarly, the
impossibility result would not hold in the presence of moral hazard instead of adverse
selection. Theorem 1 thus shares some similitude with Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983)
impossibility result, in that the incompatibility of their two properties, namely ex-post
eciency and interim individual rationality, also requires the presence of both incentive
constraints and incomplete information.16
5. PARTIAL AXIOMATIC RESULTS
Readers will nd in the Introduction the motivation that justies the weaker version
of MON that I am about to dene. Interim utilities are transferable17 at an incentive
ecient mechanism  if, for all (i;j) 2 I  I with i 6= j and all (ti;tj) 2 Ti  Tj that
comes with positive probability (p(ti;tj) > 0), there exists a feasible mechanism  such
that
Ui(jti) > Ui(jti), Uj(jtj) < Uj(jtj), and
(8k 2 I)(8tk 2 Tk) : (k;tk) 62 f(i;ti);(j;tj)g ) Uk(jtk)  Uk(jtk):
15Again, the general argument is left to the reader.
16Indeed, if any mechanism could be implemented in Myerson and Satterthwaite's example without
having to bother with incentive constraints, then any mechanism in Wilson's (1978) coarse core (which,
he proved, is non-empty in even much more general exchange economies), is both interim individually
rational and ex-post ecient (because of quasi-linearity). On the other hand, the rst-best can be
achieved in Myerson and Satterthwaite's example (and many other quasi-linear environments), even
while imposing the incentive constraints, if decisions are made at the ex-ante stage (see e.g. d'Aspremont
ans G erard-Varet (1979, 1982)). It is then always possible to design some type-independent monetary
transfer to meet the (ex-ante) individual rationality constraints.
17Cf. footnote 5.
14Restricted Monotonicity (R-MON) Let S and S0 be two social choice problem. Suppose
that S0 diers from S only in that more collective decisions are available: I = I0, D  D0,
Ti = T 0
i, and ui(d;t) = u0
i(d;t), for each i 2 I, each d 2 D, and each t 2 T. Let
 2 (S) be such that interim utilities are transferable at , and let 0 2 (S0). Then
Ui(0jti)  Ui(jti), for each ti 2 Ti, and each i 2 I.
R-MON remains silent when it comes to mechanisms  2 (S) at which interim utilities
are not transferable, contrary to MON. It is thus weaker than MON.
R-MON is now compatible with I-EFF. I will now add three axioms in the spirit
of Kalai (1977, Theorem 1) in order to obtain a partial characterizarion of a natural
extension of the egalitarian principle. The rst property requires the social choice function
to be covariant with respect to renaming the individuals and/or their types, as well as
relabeling collective decisions.
Anonymity (AN) Let S = (I;D;d;(Ti)i2I;p;(ui)i2I) and S0 = (I;D;d;(T 0
i)i2I;p0;
(u0
i)i2I) be two social choice problems. Suppose that there exist an isomorphism f : I ! I,
an isomorphism g : D ! D with g(d) = d, and isomorphisms hi : Ti ! T 0
f(i) (one for
each i 2 I) such that
1. (8t 2 T) : p(t) = p0(h(t))), and
2. (8t 2 T)(8i 2 I)(8d 2 D) : ui(d;t) = u0
f(i)(g(d);h(t)),
with the convention h(t) = (hi(ti))i2I. Then 0 2 (S0) if and only if  2 (S), where 
is the mechanism for S dened as follows: the probability of implementing d 2 D when
rst individual reports t1 2 T1, ..., and the Ith individual reports tI 2 TI is equal to the
probability of implementing g(d) under 0 when individual f(1) reports h1(t1), ..., and
individual f(I) reports hI(tI).
Most results in social choice under complete information, including Kalai's, are phrased
in the space of utilities. This is sometimes referred to as the welfarist assumption. Fol-
lowing the same approach is not exactly feasible under incomplete information, as one
needs to know the underlying decisions in order to have the possibility of phrasing the
incentive constraints. Yet, one can impose an axiom in that spirit after taking these
constraints into account. Readers will nd a more detailed motivation for the next two
axioms in the Introduction.
Interim Welfarism (I-WELF) Let S = (I;D;d;(Ti)i2I;p;(ui)i2I) and S0 = (I0;D0;d0;
(T 0
i)i2I;p0;(u0
i)i2I) be two social choice problems. If Ti = T 0
i, for each i 2 I, and
U(F(S)) = U(F(S0)), then U((S)) = U((S0)).
Of course, this denition boils down to the usual notion of welfarism under complete
information, i.e. when each type set is a singleton.
The other axiom associated to the welfarist assumption requires that if a feasible
mechanism generates the same interim utilities as another mechanism in the solution of
a problem, then it also belongs to the solution of that problem.
Exhaustivity (EX) Let S = (I;D;d;(Ti)i2I;p;(ui)i2I) be a social choice problem. If
 2 (S) and 0 is a feasible mechanism such that Ui(0jti) = Ui(jti), for all ti 2 Ti and
all i 2 I, then 0 2 (S).
15I now dene the interim lex-min solution that is partially characterized below, and that
boils down to the usual egalitarian criterion under complete information. A mechanism
 2 F(S) belongs to the interim lex-min solution of the social choice problem S =
(I;D;d;(Ti)i2I;p;(ui)i2I),  2 lex(S), if and only if (u()) maximizes (u) according




+ is the function
that rearrange the components of a vector increasingly.
Theorem 2 The interim lex-min solution lex satises I-EFF, AN, R-MON, I-WELF,
and EX. In addition, if  is a solution that satises the ve axioms, and S = (I;D;d;(Ti)i2I;p;(ui)i2I)
is a social choice problem such that
1. #Ti = #Tj, for all i;j, and
2. there exists  2 lex(S) at which interim utilities are transferable,
then (S) = lex(S).
Proof: Let S = (I;D;d;(Ti)i2I;p;(ui)i2I) be a social choice problem. Observe that, if
interim utilities are transferable at  2 lex(S), then Ui(jti) = Uj(jtj), for all ti 2 Ti, all
tj 2 Tj, and all i;j 2 I. Indeed, otherwise, there exist (i;ti) and (j;tj) with i 6= j such that
Ui(jti) < Uj(jtj). Since interim utilities are transferable at , there exists a mechanism
0 2 F(S) such that Ui(0jti) > Ui(jti), Uj(0jtj) < Uj(jtj), and Uk(0jtk)  Uk(jtk),
for all (k;tk) dierent from (i;ti) and (j;tj). For each  2]0;1[,  := 0+(1 ) 2 F(S).
For  small enough, (u()) strictly dominates (u()) according to the lexicographic
order, thereby contradicting  2 lex(S). So it must be indeed that all the components
of u() are identical. Consider now a larger social choice problem S0, as dened in R-
MON. Since  2 F(S0), it must be that the smallest component of u(0) is larger of equal
to the identical components of u(), for each 0 2 lex(S0). Hence lex satises R-MON,
as desired. The very denition of lex makes it straightforward to check that it satises
the four other axioms.
Consider now a solution  that satises the ve axioms, and let S be a social choice
problem that satises the two assumption in the statement of the theorem. Let  2
lex(S) such that interim utilities are transferable at , as in 2. All the components of
u() are thus identical { cf. the previous paragraph. Let  be this common component.
The reasoning to prove that (S) = lex(S) requires the consideration of other related
social choice problems. I start by dening some of them. The rst alternative problem
is obtained by changing both the common prior and the utility functions so as to keep
the set of interim utilities that are achievable via feasible mechanisms unchanged: S1 =
(I;D;d;(Ti)i2I;p1;(u1
i)i2I), with p1 being the uniform probability distribution on T, and
u1
i(d;t) := #(T i)p(t ijti)ui(d;t), for all (d;t) and all i. Notice that this modication does
not change the individuals' interim evaluations of any mechanism since the products of the
conditional probabilities with the state-contingent utilities remain constant (see Myerson,
1984a, Section 3). Hence U(F(S1)) = U(F(S)), and  2 lex(S1).
Since  is incentive ecient, a simple separation argument implies that there exists  2
i2IR
Ti




ti2Ti i(ti)Ui(jti), over all  2 F(S1). Given that
16interim utilities are transferable at , all the components of  must actually be strictly
positive. Let W  be the value of that weighted sum when evaluated at . Following
Myerson's virtual utility construction (see also Lemma 4 in the Appendix), it is possible to
construct an auxiliary problem S2 = (I;D2;(Ti)i2I;p1;(u2
i)i2I), where D2 = D[fdi;tijti 2
Ti;i 2 Ig, u2
i(;t) = u1
i(;t) on D, for all t and all i, and such that U(F(S2)) is the convex
hull of the vectors 0 and ui;ti, for each ti 2 Ti and each i 2 I, where u
i;ti
j (tj) = 0, for
all (j;tj) 6= (i;ti), and u
i;ti
i (ti) = W =i(ti). Notice that  2 lex(S2), since  remains
incentive ecient in that larger problem.
Lemma 5 in the Appendix shows that it is possible to dene utility functions u3 and,
for each combination (i;ti), a collective decision ^ di;ti such that
1. U3
i (^ di;tijti) = W =i(ti);
2. U3
i (^ di;tijt0
i) = 0 if t0
i 6= ti;
3. U3
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C = fx 2 R
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+j(8i 2 I) : xi + 
X
j2Infig
xj  (1 + (#I   1))g:


















p1(ti). Suppose then that J is nonempty, and let i be an
element of J. The i-inequality in the denition of C implies that xi   
P
j2InJ( xj).






























Let S4 = (I;D4;d;(Ti)i2I;p1;(u4
i)i2I) be the social choice problem with D4 = CT and
u4
i(d4;t) = d4
i(t), for all d4 2 D4, all i 2 I, and all t 2 T. Observe that the problem S4 is
symmetric, and hence AN and (1) imply that the interim utility of any mechanism in the
solution of that problem must give equal interim utility to all the players and whatever
their private information. I-EFF and EX imply that the constant mechanism that selects
(;:::;) in C, for all t 2 T, belongs to (S4). It is easy to check that interim utilities
are transferable at that constant mechanism. The combination of R-MON and EX imply
17that it also belong to (S5), where S5 = (I;D5;d;(Ti)i2I;p1;(u5
i)i2I) is the social choice
problem with D5 = D3 [ D4, u5
i(d5;t) = u3
i(d5;t) if d5 2 D3 and u5
i(d5;t) = u4
i(d5;t)
if d5 2 D4, for all d5 2 D5, all i 2 I, and all t 2 T. Indeed, the way  was chosen
guarantees that the constant mechanism is incentive ecient in S5 (cf. 4. and the
previous paragraph). EX implies that any feasible mechanism that gives the same vector
of interim utilities also belongs to (S5). Let's choose one that can be expressed via
lotteries on D3, which is possible since the constant mechanisms that pick one of the
decisions in D3 independently of the individuals' reports generate all the extreme points
of Ueff(F(S5)). R-MON and EX imply that it must remain a solution to S3. I-WELF
imply that any mechanism in the solution of S2 must have the same interim utilities,
and  must thus belong to (S2), by EX. R-MON and EX imply that  2 (S1). Hence
lex(S1)  (S1), or lex(S1) = (S1), by (1). I-WELF and EX allow to conclude that
lex(S) = (S), as desired. 
When there is complete information, i.e. when the type sets are singletons, Theorem
2 is similar to Kalai (1977, Theorem 1), or more precisely Moulin's (1988, Theorem 3.2)
variant. There, cooperative opportunities are phrased directly in the space of utilities,
making I-WELF and EX part of the model itself. Assumption 1 in the previous theorem is
trivially satised under complete information. \Minimal transferability" guarantees that
assumption 2 is also satised, and that the egalitarian solution satises the analogue of
MON. In the absence of such assumptions, some authors have succeeded in characterizing
the interim lex-min solution in that framework (see Imai, 1983, and Chun and Peters,
1989). Unfortunately, I have not been able yet to extend these results to social choice
problems under incomplete information.
I now propose a variant of Theorem 2 that will prove useful in applications. It is
important to have a partial characterization result that does not involve the cardinality
restriction on the type sets (see condition 1 in Theorem 2). To that end, I impose a
new axiom that is similar to \Splitting Types," as rst dened by Harsanyi and Selten
(1972) (see also Axiom 6 in Weidner (1992)). Let S = (I;D;d;(Ti)i2I;p;(ui)i2I) be
a social choice problem, and let tj be a type of an individual j. The social choice
problem S0 = (I;D;d;(T 0
i)i2I;p0;(u0
i)i2I) obtained from S by splitting type tj is dened
as follows: T 0
i = Ti, for all i 2 I n fjg, T 0
j = (Tj n ftjg) [ ftj1;tj2g, p0(t0) = p(t0), for
all t0 2 T 0 such that t0
j 62 ftj1;tj2g, p0(tj1;t j) = p0(tj2;t j) = p(t)=2, for all t j 2 T j,
u0




i(d;tj2;t j) = ui(d;t), for all i 2 I, all d 2 D, and all t j 2 T j. So
individual j's types has been splitted into two sub-types that have the same information
and the same preferences as when of type tj in the original problem. As for j's other
types, nothing has changed, and for the other individuals, they see j's two new subtypes
half as likely as tj in the original problem, and as having the exact same properties as tj
otherwise. Such a split is thus an irrelevant change in the way to model the situation at
hand,18 and it should be inconsequential on the solution of the problem. This is indeed
18If a mechanism  : T ! (D) is feasible for S, then 0 : T0 ! (D) is feasible for S0, where
0 is dened as follows: 0(t0) = (t0), for all t0 2 T0 such that t0
j 62 ftj1;tj2g, and 0(tj1;t j) =
0(tj2;t j) = (t), for all t j 2 T j. Conversely, if a mechanism 0 : T0 ! (D) is feasible for S0, then
18the content of the following axiom.
Irrelevant Splitting of a Type (IST) Let S = (I;D;d;(Ti)i2I;p;(ui)i2I) be a social
choice problem, and let S0 be the problem derived from S by splitting individual j's type
tj into two types tj1 and tj2. If  2 (S), then 0 2 (S0), where 0(t0) = (t0), for all
t0 2 T 0 such that t0
j 62 ftj1;tj2g, and 0(tj1;t j) = 0(tj2;t j) = (t), for all t j 2 T j.
The second change with respect to Theorem 2 is the introduction of an axiom of inde-
pendence of irrelevant alternatives. It will allow to weaken a bit condition 2 in Theorem
2.
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) Let S and S0 be two social choice
problem. Suppose that S0 diers from S only in that more collective decisions are avail-
able: I = I0, D  D0, Ti = T 0
i, and ui(d;t) = u0
i(d;t), for each i 2 I, each d 2 D, and
each t 2 T. If  2 (S0) \ F(S), then  2 (S).
MON implies IIA. R-MON implies IIA only when interim utilities are transferable in
the smaller problem. IIA is thus only a small addition to the list of axioms. It will be
interesting to note that lex satises IIA, even though it does not satisfy MON.19
Theorem 2' The interim lex-min solution lex satises I-EFF, AN, R-MON, I-WELF,
EX, IST, and IIA. In addition, if  is a solution that satises the seven axioms, and S =
(I;D;d;(Ti)i2I;p;(ui)i2I) is a social choice problem for which there exists  2 lex(S)
such that
1. there exists  2 i2IR
Ti





2. Ui(jti) = Uj(jtj), for each i 6= j and each t 2 T.
then (S) = lex(S).
Proof: We already argued that lex satises the rst ve axioms. It is straightforward to
check that it satises IIA. IST follows from the fact that the set of interim utilities that
can be achieved in the splitted problem is the set of interim utilities that can be achieved
in the original problem, except that the utility associated to the (j;tj) component now
appears twice (once for (j;tj1) and once for (j;tj2), cf. footnote 18).
Uj(0jtj1) = Uj(0jtj2) and the mechanism  : T ! (D) is feasible, where (t0) = 0(t0), for all t0 2 T
such that t0
j 6= tj, and either (t) = 0(tj1;t j), for all t j 2 T j, or (t) = 0(tj2;t j), for all t j 2 T j.
19IIA captures a property of rationality on the part of the uninformed third party making the collective
decision. A violation of IIA would require a strong argument to justify such behavioral irrationality.
MON or R-MON, on the other hand, go beyond by imposing some principle of distributive justice,
thereby narrowing the type of moral preference that this social planner or arbitrator is maximizing.
Here, alternative properties might be meaningful as well, and leading to characterization of other moral
preferences, or alternative characterizations of the same moral preferences.
20The interim lex-min solution selects incentive ecient mechanisms, and thus there necessarily exists
 2 i2IR
Ti




ti2Ti i(ti)Ui(jti). Condition 1 in Theorem 2'
is a technical condition that requires the existence of a strictly positive . It is most often satised. It
is always satised, for instance, if D is nite.
19Consider now a solution  that satises the seven axioms, and let S be a social
choice problem that satises the two assumption in the statement of the theorem. Let
 2 lex(S). All the components of u() are identical, by 2. Let  be this common
component. As for Theorem 2, the reasoning to prove that (S) = lex(S) requires
the consideration of other related social choice problems. Though not very important,
it is easier to apply the results from the Appendix if all the type proles come with a
strictly positive probability, and so I will consider a rst modied social choice problem
S1 where the probability distribution is uniform, but the utility functions are redened
so as to keep the interim utilities unchanged - see the proof of Theorem 2. Particularly,
 2 lex(S1).
The next modied problem is obtained by splitting the types in S1 so as to obtain
a new problem where all the individuals have the same number of possible types. Let
 = maxi2I #Ti, let hi : Ti ! f1;:::;g be an injective function, for each i 2 I, let  t 2 T,






















i = f1;:::;g, for each i 2 I, p2(t2) = p1(g(t2))=fi2Ijgi(t2
i)= tig( + 1   #Ti),
and u2
i(d;t2) = u1
i(d;g(t2)), for each i 2 I, where g(t2) = (gi(t2
i))i2I. So S2 diers from
S1 only in that, for each i 2 I, type  ti has been splitted suciently many times so that
individual i has  possible types. The splitted version of  (iteration of the denition
in IST { see also footnote 18) belongs to lex(S2), and the associated vector of interim
utilities is constant, with  being the common component.
Condition 1 implies that there exists  2 i2IR
T2
i







over all  2 F(S2). Let W  be the value of that weighted sum when evaluated at .
As when moving from S1 to S2 in the proof of Theorem 2, it is possible to construct an
auxiliary problem S3 = (I;D3;(T 2
i )i2I;p2;(u3
i)i2I), where D2 = D [ fdi;tijti 2 Ti;i 2 Ig,
u3
i(;t) = u2
i(;t) on D, for all t and all i, and such that U(F(S3)) is the convex hull
of the vectors 0 and ui;ti, for each ti 2 Ti and each i 2 I, where u
i;ti
j (tj) = 0, for all
(j;tj) 6= (i;ti), and u
i;ti
i (ti) = W =i(ti). Notice that the splitted version of  belongs
to lex(S3), since it remains incentive ecient in that larger problem. The assumption
of Theorem 2 are satised for S3, and hence the splitted version of  belongs to (S3).
This mechanism also belongs to (S2), by IIA. Hence any mechanism in (S2) generates
a constant vector of interim utilities, with  being the common component.
Let  2 (S). I-WELF and EX implies that  2 (S1). IST implies that the splitted
version of  belongs to (S2). Condition (1) implies that the associated vector of interim
20utilities is constant, with each component being equal to . Hence Ui(jti) =  = Ui(jti),
for all ti 2 Ti and all i 2 I. EX implies that  2 (S). Hence lex(S)  (S). EX and
(1) implies that lex(S) = (S), as desired. 
6. EGALITARIANISM AND UTILITARIANISM RECONCILED
The egalitarian solution requires the possibility of measuring the individuals' utility
gains in some common units. Also, when such measurements are possible, the egalitarian
principle often comes in con
ict with other normative criteria, the most prominent alter-
native being the utilitarian principle. Various authors (see e.g. Harsanyi (1963), Shapley
(1969), Yaari (1981)) showed that these two observations can be dealt with simultane-
ously in the following sense. There is a unique way to rescale the participants' utilities so
that there exists a feasible option that is optimal according to both the egalitarian and
the utilitarian criteria (in the rescaled utilities). In addition, any such option is optimal
according to Nash' product criterion (either in the original or in the rescaled utilities,
since that criterion is invariant to linear transformations). Nehring (2004) has argued
that maximizing the ex-ante sum of the individuals' utilities is the natural extension of
the utilitarian criterion to problems with incomplete information. It is also the criterion
that was applied, for instance, in Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) to select a specic
incentive compatible after proving the incompatibility if ex-post eciency, interim in-
dividual rationality and incentive compatibility. The analysis of the previous section
suggests that lex is a natural extension of the egalitarian solution to frameworks with
incomplete information. One may thus wonder whether there is a way, in each social
choice problem, to make both criteria compatible by rescaling the participants' interim
utilities. The next theorem answers positively. Interestingly, it turns out that it is not
necessary anymore to resort to a lexicographic renement of the egalitarian criterion,
contrarily to the previous section, as perfect equality of all the interim utilities can be
achieved in the rescaled problem. In addition, the coincidence of the extended utilitar-
ian and egalitarian criteria occurs at mechanisms that maximize Harsanyi and Selten's
(1972) weighted Nash product, where the weight of each type of each participant equals
its marginal probability. Weidner (1992) obtained a direct axiomatic characterization of
that solution in a similar framework as the one studied here, but under the assumption
of independent types.
Theorem 3 Let S = (I;D;d;(Ti)i2I;p;(ui)i2I) be a social choice problem, and let  2
F(S). Then





if and only if  satises the two following conditions for some  2 i2IR
Ti
++:






2. (8t 2 T)(8i 2 I)(8j 2 I) : U
i (jti) = U
j (jtj);
21where U
i (jti) := i(ti)Ui(jti), for each ti 2 Ti and each i 2 I.
Proof: Let W  = i2Iti2Ti[Ui(jti)]p(ti). Since it is assumed that there exists at least
one element of U(F(S)) with only strictly positive components, it must be that W  > 0






are both closed and convex. Under (3), their intersection is the singleton f(Ui(jti))ti2Ti;i2Ig.
Hence the separating hyperplane theorem implies that (3) is equivalent to the existence
of a vector l 2 i2IRTi for wich the two following conditions hold:





2. l is proportional to the gradient of the curve fu 2 i2IR
Ti
+ji2Iti2Tiui(ti)p(ti) 
W g at (Ui(jti))ti2Ti;i2I.






for all ti 2 Ti and all i 2 I. The result thus follows, by taking i(ti) = li(ti)=p(ti), for all
ti 2 Ti and all i 2 I. 
7. APPLICATIONS
In this section, I illustrate the previous results in some detail in three quasi-linear
examples. The rst one is about sharing the output created by individuals with private
information regarding their marginal productivity. The main purpose of that rst exam-
ple is to show how Theorem 2 can be applied, and to note that lex coincides with the
ex-post egalitarian solution in problems where incentive constraints do not play a critical
role (information is non-exclusive in the sense of Postlewaite and Schmeidler (1986)) and
there is no aggregate uncertainty regarding the total prot to be shared. The second ex-
ample is about the production of a public good and how to share its cost, while the third
example is about fair terms of trade. Beyond learning by observing how lex behaves,
these two examples will illustrate how Theorem 2' is an important complement to Theo-
rem 2, but also that there are cases where neither apply. Theorem 3 will prove useful in
nding the incentive compatible mechanism that maximizes Harsanyi and Selten's (1972)
weighted Nash product. The emphasis in the following examples is placed on simplicity
rather than generality.
Example 1 Consider a cooperative of 100 individuals who collectively own a technology.






22where i is agent i's marginal productivity, which is known to him alone. On the other
hand, it is commonly known that 30 of them have a relatively high marginal productiv-
ity (i(H) = 2), while the remaining individuals' marginal productivity is rather low
(i(L) = 1). The cost of performing an eort e is e2=20, for all the individuals (in-
dependently of their marginal productivity). Formally, the social choice problem is S =
(I;D;d;(Ti)i2I;p;(ui)i2I), where I = f1;:::;100g, D = f(e;) 2 RI
+RI
+g, d = (0;0),
Ti = fL;Hg, for each i 2 I, p(t) = k=(1002), where k is the number of type proles with









for each (e;) 2 D and each t 2 T, where i thus denotes the proportion of the output
going to individual i, for each i 2 I.





(0;0) if #fj 2 Ijtj = Hg 6= 30
(10; 14:5
1300) if #fj 2 Ijtj = Hg = 30 and ti = L
(20; 29:5
1300) if #fj 2 Ijtj = Hg = 30 and ti = H
for each i 2 I. This mechanism is incentive ecient (and also ex-post ecient). Also,
Ui((e;)jti) = 9:5, for all ti 2 Ti and all i 2 I. In addition, it is the only mechanism
that achieves these interim utilities, and hence lex(S) = f(e;)g. Interim utilities are
transferable at (e;). Thus Theorem 2 applies, and any solution  that satises EFF,
R-MON, AN, I-WELF, and EX must coincide with lex. The mechanism (e;) also
maximizes Harsanyi and Selten's (1972) weighted Nash product over F(S). This follows






over  2 F(S) if i(L) = i(H) = 1, for all i 2 I.
Example 2 Consider the following problem, as in Myerson (1979). Two individuals
have the option to cooperate by investing in a public project that costs $100, which is
known to bring a satisfaction of $90 to the second individual, and either a satisfaction of
$30, with probability p, or of $90, with probability 1 p, to the rst individual. Formally,
I = f1;2g, D = f(x;m) 2 f0;1g  R2jm1 + m2   100xg, where x = 0 means that the
project is not carried out, x = 1 means that the project is carried out, d = (0;(0;0)), T1 =
f30;90g,21 u1((x;m);30) = 30x + m1, u1((x;m);90) = 90x + m1, and u2((x;m);30) =
u2((x;m);90) = 90x + m2.
U(F(S)) thus coincides with the set of vectors
(30 x(30)+  m1(30);90 x(90)+  m1(90);90(p x(30)+(1 p) x(90))+p m2(30)+(1 p) m2(90));
21T2 is ignored to make notations lighter. This is inconsequential, since T2 is a singleton, the second








Figure 1: Illustration of Example 2 for p=1/10
(36,36;36)
(27,37.38;36)
Egalitarian solution in blue
Harsanyi/Selten solution in green
Utilitarian solution in red
that satisfy the following constraints:
 m1(30) +  m2(30)   100 x(30) and  m1(90) +  m2(90)   100 x(90); (4)
30( x(90)    x(30))   m1(30)    m1(90)  90( x(90)    x(30)); (5)
where  x(t1) denotes the expected probability of implementing the public project when the
rst individual reports t1, and  mi(t1) is the expected monetary payo received by in-
dividual i when the rst individual reports t1. Indeed, a feasible mechanism must se-
lect lotteries dened over D, and taking expectations of the feasibility constraints will
give (4). Conversely, any vector ( x(t1);  m1(t1);  m2(t1))) can be seen as the expectation
of the lottery that picks [x = 0, m = (0;0)] with probability 1    x(t1), and [x = 1,
m = ( m1(t1)= x(t1);  m2(t1)= x(t1))] with probability  x(t1), which selects elements of D
whenever (4) is satised. Inequalities in (5), on the other hand, represent the incentive
contraints. A traditional reasoning allows to conclude that interim incentive eciency
implies that  x(90) = 1, and both inequalities in (4), as well as the second inequality of
(5) are binding. If p = 1=10, as in Myerson (1979), then simple computations imply that
Ueff(F(S)) is the set of vectors
(30 x(30) +  m1(30);90 x(30) +  m1(30);72   82 x(30)    m1(30)); (6)
with  x(30) 2 [0;1] and  m1(30) 2 R. It is then easy to check that a feasible mechanism
belongs to lex(S) if and only if  x(30) = 0,  m1(30) = 36,  m2(30) =  36,  x(90) = 1,
 m1(90) =  54, and  m2(90) =  46, in which case both individuals get an expected utility
24of 36, independently of the true state. Theorem 2' implies that any solution that satises I-
EFF, R-MON, AN, I-WELF, EX, IST, and IIA must coincide with lex in this numerical
example. The ex-ante utilitarian solution, on the other hand, will contain only pooling
mechanisms with  x(30) =  x(90) = 1,  m1(90) =  m1(30), and  m2(30) =  m2(90) =  100  
 m1(30), leaving the choice of  m1(30) open. So, in this example, it does not rene the set of
ex-ante incentive ecient mechanisms. The interim utilities are 30+  m1(30) for the rst
individual when he values the public project at 30, 90+  m1(30) for the rst individual when
he values the public project at 90, and 90   m1(30) in expectation for the second individual.
One can apply Theorem 2 to nd Harsanyi and Selten's (1972) weighted Nash product
over U(F(S)). One concludes from (6) that the vector (2=15;13=15;1) is orthogonal
to Ueff(F(S)). If the weighted Nash optimum is reached at a point in the interior of
Ueff(F(S)), then it must be for  = (20=15;26=27;1), given the rst condition in Theorem
2. Solving then for the two equations implied by the second condition in Theorem 2, one
obtains  x(30) = 189=1092  = 0:173,  m1(30) = 567=26  = 21:81,  m2(30) =  1017=26  =
 39:12,  x(90) = 1,  m1(90) =  684=13  =  52:62, and  m2(90) =  616=13  =  47:38,
which turns out to be a feasible mechanism. The Harsanyi-Selten solution being unique,
we are thus done solving the problem. The interim utilities are 27 for the rst individual
when he values the public project at 30, 486=13  = 37:38 for the rst individual when he
values the public project at 90, and 36 in expectation for the second individual.
The set of incentive ecient mechanisms and the three solutions are represented in the
space of interim utilities on Figure 1. The utilitarian solution does not place any weight
on the distribution of the gains from cooperation, and thereby allows to be more ecient
in aggregate, the public project being implemented for sure independently of individual 1's
type. On the other hand, this is achieved at the cost of equity, being too generous towards
individual 1 when he values the public project at $90, because one cannot rely on him to
report his type for free. The second individual, for instance, cannot expect a gain larger
than $20, while the aggregate benet is $80 with probability 9=10 and $20 with probability
1=10. The rst individual's information rent vanishes at the egalitarian solution, in that
both types of the rst individual receive the same interim utility, but this comes at the
cost of not implementing the public project when the rst individual does not care much
for it. Note that even though some mutually benecial cooperative opportunities are not
exploited, the mechanism itself, on the other hand, is incentive ecient. As already hinted
by Theorem 2, the Harsanyi/Selten solution strikes a compromise between two con
icting
points of view, allowing the public project to be realized with a positive probability when
the rst individual has the low type, but not systematically, so as to avoid being too soft
on individual 1 when of the high type because of his informational advantage.
Suppose now that there is a probability 9=10 that the rst individual values the public
project at $30, instead of 1=10. Starting from inequalities (4) and (5), it is easy to check
that Ueff(F(S)) is the set of vectors
(30 +  m;90 +  m; 10    m); (7)
with  m 2 R. In other words, incentive ecient mechanisms must be pooling, with the
public project being implemented for sure regardless of the rst individual's report, and
25the expected monetary compensation being constant. In this case, the rst individual has
a larger payo when of the high type than when of the low type at any incentive ecient
mechanism, and hence neither Theorem 2, nor Theorem 2', applies. The interim lex-
min solution, on the other hand, seems to make sense. Since individual 1 systematically
enjoys a payo that is larger by a constant amount of $60 when of a high type compared
to the low type alternative, he is left aside and all what matters is to choose m so as to
equalize the second individual's expected payo with the rst individual's payo when he
values the public project at $30. Hence one must choose  m =  $20, and the associated
vector of interim utilities is (10;70;10). The ex-ante utilitarian solution does not rene
the set of incentive ecient mechanisms, while the Harsanyi-Selten solution selects a  m
that is slightly smaller than  $20, thereby being slightly more generous towards the second
individual.22
More generally, Theorem 2' will apply whenever p < 3=4, and the interim lex-min
solution will prescribe to implement the public project if and only if the rst individual
reports his high type. In that case, he pays $90, while the second individual pays $10. In
addition, a monetary transfer of $(1   p)40 goes from the second to the rst individual,
independently of the type reported. The interim utility enjoyed by each type of each
individual is (1   p)40. Theorems 1 and 1' will not apply when p  3=4, in which case
the interim lex-min solution has the public project implemented independently of the rst
individual's report, with 1 paying 20% of the cost, and 2 the remaining 80%.
Example 3 Consider the following bilateral trade problem, as in Myerson (1991, Section
10.3). A rst individual owns one unit of a divisible good that is worth more to a second
individual than to him. The good can be of relatively low quality, with probability p, in
which case the good is worth $20 per unit to the rst individual and $30 per unit to the
second individual, or of relatively high quality, with probability 1 p, in which case the good
is worth $40 per unit to the rst individual and $50 per unit to the second individual. The
true quality of the object is known to the seller only. Cooperating here means agreeing on
a quantity to trade against some monetary compensation, as a function of what the seller
reveals about the quality of the good he owns. The problem is to nd a fair compensation
scheme. Formally, I = f1;2g, D = f(x;m) 2 [0;1]  R2jm1 + m2  0g, where x
represents the quantity traded, d = (0;(0;0)), T1 = fL;Hg,23 u1((x;m);L) = m1   20x,
u1((x;m);H) = m1   40x, u2((x;m);L) = 30x + m2, and u2((x;m);H) = 50x + m2.
U(F(S)) thus coincides with the set of vectors
(m1(L)   20x(L);m1(H)   40x(H);p(30x(L) + m2(L)) + (1   p)(50x(H) + m2(H)))
22Not surprisingly, the Harsanyi-Selten solution converges towards the egalitarian solution, as p gets
closer to 1, as the problem then approaches a problem with both complete information and transferable
utilities, in which case the Nash and the egalitarian solutions coincide.
23As in the previous example, T2 is ignored to make notations lighter. This is inconsequential, since







Figure 2: Illustration of Example 3 for p=4/5
(4,4;4)
(4.57,2.67;4)
Egalitarian solution in blue
Harsanyi/Selten solution in green
Utilitarian solution in red
that satisfy the following constraints:24
m1(L) + m2(L)  0 and m1(H) + m2(H)  0; (8)
20(x(L)   x(H))  m1(L)   m1(H)  40(x(L)   x(H)); (9)
where (x(t1);m(t1)) 2 [0;1]  R, for each t1 2 fL;Hg. A traditional reasoning allows to
conclude that interim incentive eciency implies that x(L) = 1, and both inequalities in
(8), as well as the rst inequality of (9) are binding. If p = 4=5, as in Myerson (1991),
then simple computations imply that Ueff(F(S)) is the set of vectors
(m   20x;m   40x;8 + 26x   m); (10)
with (x;m) 2 [0;1]  R representing the quantity traded and the monetary compensation
from 2 to 1 when the rst individual reports H. Ueff(F(S)) thus coincides with the triangle
whose vertices are (80=7;0;0), (8;8;0), and (0;0;8), as represented on Figure 2. The
interim lex-min solution leads to the mechanism with (x;m) = (0;4), in which case
both individuals enjoy an interim utility of 4 whatever their types (this remains true
for any p > 1=3). Theorem 2' implies that any solution that satises I-EFF, R-MON,
AN, I-WELF, EX, IST, and IIA must coincide with the interim lex-min solution in
this numerical example. The ex-ante utilitarian solution, on the other hand, selects the
24Utilities being linear in both the good and money, there is no loss of generality in discussing only
deterministic mechanisms.
27mechanism that is most advantageous to the rst individual when he is of a low type
- (x;m) = (4=7;160=7) leading to the extreme vector of interim utilities (80=7;0;0).
Contrarily to the previous example, the ex-ante utilitarian principle does rene the set of
feasible mechanisms that are ex-ante ecient (which leads to interim utilities along the
segment that joins (0;0;8) to (80=7;0;0)). One can apply Theorem 2 to nd Harsanyi
and Selten's (1972) weighted Nash product over U(F(S)). One concludes from (10) that
the vector (7=10;3=10;1) is orthogonal to Ueff(F(S)). If the weighted Nash optimum is
reached at a point in the interior of Ueff(F(S)), then it must be for  = (7=8;3=2;1),
given the rst condition in Theorem 2. Solving then for the two equations implied by
the second condition in Theorem 2, one obtains the feasible mechanism corresponding to
the combination (x;m) = (2=21;136=21). The Harsanyi-Selten solution being unique, we
are thus done solving the problem. The interim utilities are 32=7  = 4:57 for the rst
individual when of a low type, 56=21  = 2:67 for the rst individual when of a high type,
and 4 in expectation for the second individual.
More generally, Theorem 2' applies whenever p > 1=3, and the interim lex-min so-
lution prescribes trade in full against $34 when the rst individual's report is L, and no
trade, but still with a transfer of $4 from 2 to 1 when the report is H. The interim utilities
are (4;4;4). If, on the other hand, the high type is rather likely to occur (p  1=3) then in-
centive eciency occurs only at pooling mechanisms where full trade occurs independently
of the rst individual's report. In that case, the low type always gets a larger utility than
the high type, and Theorem 2' will not apply. The interim lex-min solution then follows
the pragmatic principle of equalizing the two remaining payos. This leads to trade in
full with a transfer of $45 10p from 2 to 1, independently of the rst individual's report.
8. CONCLUDING COMMENTS
I explained in Section 4 why informational constraints may imply the incompatibility of
EFF and MON, even on the class of quasi-linear social choice problems. Weakening MON
into R-MON, I presented in Section 5 two partial axiomatic characterizations for lex that
are applicable only to social choice problems S for which there exists an incentive ecient
mechanism  such that Ui(jti) = Uj(jtj), for all i 6= j and all t 2 T. I will thus restrict
the discussion in this section to those social choice problems.
Mechanisms in lex are obviously equitable in those problems in the following sense:
an uninformed third party (social planner or arbitrator) can be sure that all the indi-
viduals enjoy the same expected benets given their own private information, and this
whatever the actual prole of types. Example 2 was particularly simple to solve be-
cause information is non-exclusive (implying that rst-best eciency can be achieved via
incentive compatible mechanisms), and there is no aggregate uncertainty regarding the
number of low and high types in the population. In that case, lex coincides with the ex-
post egalitarian solution. One might have another equity criterion in mind, for instance
that people have the right to consume a quantity that is somehow linked to what they
have produced. This is a classical discussion in Distributive Justice that, of course, re-
mains present under incomplete information as well. The purpose of the present paper is
28strictly limited to the extension of the egalitarian principle to problems with asymmetric
information. In that case, any member of the society has an equal right over the ecient
surplus that can be created, independently of the role he or she has played in the creation
of that surplus. Extending other principles, such as the Shapley value, for instance, is an
interesting topic for further research (see Myerson (1984b) for a rst denition, and the
subsequent discussion in de Clippel's (2004)). A natural direction to go after this paper
would be to extend Kalai and Samet (1985) to problems with asymmetric information.
I hope that the present paper will serve as a benchmark for future work in social choice
under incomplete information. I see lex as the most straightforward extension of the
egalitarian principle. While it does capture obvious equity considerations, as discussed
in the previous paragraph, I believe that there might be alternative appealing ways to
proceed. Here is an example of solution that takes more into account what the individuals
know to determine what is equitable. I will restrict attention to the class of quasi-linear
problems. Given his own information, an individual i of type ti can evaluate the total












(with the convention si;ti() = 1=#I if both Ui(jti) and TSi;ti() are equal to zero).
One may have to accept ineciency in some type proles in order to satisfy the incentive
constraints. For instance, the public good is not always implemented at incentive ecient
mechanisms in Example 3, when t1 = 30 and p < 3=4, and trade does not always occur
at incentive ecient mechanisms in Example 4, when t1 = 40 and p > 1=3. More gen-
erally, we know from Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) that ex-post eciency, interim
individual rationality and incentive compatibility may be incompatible. This is why it
is more natural for the denition of the total surplus to be endogenous to the mech-
anism considered, instead of taking the maximal total surplus that could be achieved
in the absence of incentive constraints. Another meaningful denition of egalitarianism
under incomplete information would then be to try nd an interim individually ratio-
nal and incentive ecient mechanism  that equalizes the shares in each type prole:
si;ti() = sj;tj(), for all i;j 2 I and all t 2 T. Perfect equalization being not always
possible, as with lex, the general denition of this alternative criterion is to maximize,
according to the lexicographic ordering, the vector (s()) over the set of individually
rational and incentive ecient mechanisms . The associated solution will be denoted
. Notice that, if an interim individually rational and incentive ecient mechanism 
for a social choice problem S is such that si;ti() = sj;tj(), for all i;j 2 I and all t 2 T,
then  2 (S) and si;ti() = 1=#I, for all i 2 I and ti 2 Ti. Indeed, if  is the share



















which implies  = 1=#I. Any mechanism 0 such that (s(0)) lexicographically dom-
inates (s()) will lead to similar equations, except that the second equality is now
changed into a strict inequality for  = 1=#I, thereby leading to a contradiction and
showing that  2 (S). It also implies, conversely, that any interim individually rational
and incentive ecient mechanism  such that si;ti() = 1=#I, for all i 2 I and ti 2 Ti,
must belong to (S). Of course,  coincides with lex and the regular egalitarian
criterion when information is complete, i.e. when the type sets contain a single element.
The criterion also picks the same mechanism as lex in Example 2, because information
is non-exclusive and there is no aggregate uncertainty. Easy computations in Example
3 show that, for any p < 3=4, equalization of the shares is feasible and a mechanism
belongs to  if and only if  x(30) = 4=7,  m(30) = ( 80=7; 320=7),  x(90) = 1, and
 m(30) = ( 50; 50). Things become even clearer if the collective decision implemented
when t1 = 30 is decomposed as an explicit lottery over D: the public project is imple-
mented with probability 4=7, in which case player 1 pays $20 and player 2 pays $80 (this
distribution of the cost is ex-post egalitarian), while there is no payment and no transfer
when the public project is not implemented. The interim utilities are 40=7 for the rst
individual of type t1 = 30, 40 for the rst individual of type t1 = 90, and 40  240
7p for the
second individual. So, on the one hand, one could say that the mechanism is not equi-
table from the point of view of an uniformed third party (social planner or arbitrator), in
that dierent individuals enjoy dierent levels of satisfaction, but on the other hand the
mechanism looks equitable from the point of view of the individuals themselves, given
their private information. One must resort to the lexicographic ordering when p  3=4,
in which case the public project is implemented regardless of the rst individual's report,
who has to pay $
130 90p
5 3p , while the second individual pays $
370 210p
5 3p . In Example 4, for
any p > 1=3, equalization of the shares is feasible and a mechanism belongs to  if and
only if x(L) = 1, m(L) = (25; 25), x(H) = 1=5, and  m(H) = (9; 9) (or, equivalently,
the second individual pays $45 per unit to the rst conditional on him reporting 40 -
again this is the ex-post egalitarian outcome). The interim utilities are 5 for the rst
individual of type t1 = L, 1 for the rst individual of type t1 = H, and 1 + 4p for the
second individual, which again is dierent from the prescription made by lex. One must
resort to the lexicographic ordering when p  1=3, in which case the good is traded in
full regardless of the rst individual's report and he receives $45   10p from the second
individual, which, this time, happens to coincide with the outcome of lex.
The fact that various extensions seem sensible is a feature that makes the subject
of social choices under incomplete information richer and more interesting. Additional
and sharper axiomatic characterizations are needed to capture the essence of what dis-
tinguishes these various normative criteria. Since they all coincide in the special case
of complete information, the key normative question one must address is how to treat
information in determining what is equitable, and more specically how to treat dier-
30ent types of a same individual. The interim lex-min solution (as well as the ex-ante
utilitarian principle, and Harsanyi and Selten's (1972) weighted Nash product) seems
to treat dierent types of individuals as dierent individuals in the way it is computed.
Analogous treatments have already appeared in very dierent contexts, cf. the notion
of \type-agent" introduced by Harsanyi (1967-68) to dene the notion of Bayesian Nash
equilibrium, that also played a key role in dening a notion of core under asymmetric
information (de Clippel (2007)). Yet it seems that other inter-type compromises might
have some normative appeal as well. This is the right place to mention a third notion
of equity that would also coincides with egalitarianism in quasi-linear social choice prob-
lems under complete information (with risk-neutral individuals), but leads to dierent
recommendations under incomplete information. Procedural justice oers an interesting
alternative to the consequentialist approach that discusses equity exclusively in terms
of the outcomes selected in various problems. What matters now is to let the individ-
uals themselves select the social outcome via a procedure (or a game form) that is fair,
in a broad sense of giving them equal opportunities. \Random Dictatorship," choosing
with equal probability one of the individuals to act as a dictator, provides an example
of such procedures, at least when the resulting equilibrium outcome is Pareto ecient
(as it is under complete information if the problem is quasi-linear and individuals are
risk-neutral). This example of fair procedure is a bit extreme, since the outcome when a
dictator has been selected is clearly unfair, but at least all the individuals are in an equal
position ex-ante. Notice that \Random Dictatorship" is also a corner-stone of Myerson's
(1984a) theory of bargaining. Though trivial, there is an interesting equivalence under
complete information between the egalitarian principle and the equilibrium outcome of
that procedure in quasi-linear problems with risk-neutral individuals. This general equiv-
alence breaks down when information is incomplete. A key insight from Myerson's work
(1983 and 1984a) (see also Maskin and Tirole (1992)) is that being a dictator denes an
implicit inter-type compromise in some problems, and I will simply observe now that this
implicit compromise is incompatible with both lex and  in both Examples 3 and 4.25
Indeed, it is easy to check in Example 3 that the principal-agent game when the rst
individual is a dictator admits a unique weak sequential equilibrium outcome, with the
public project being implemented, the rst individual paying $10 and the second paying
$90, independently of the reported type. The associated interim utilities are (20;80;0).
The unique weak sequential equilibrium outcome when the second individual is the dic-
tator and p < 3=4 implies that the project is implemented only when the reported type
is 90, in which case the rst individual pays $90 and the second pays $10. The associated
interim utilities are (0;0;80(1   p)). When p > 3=4, the public project is always imple-
mented, with the rst individual paying $30 and the second paying $70. The associated
interim utilities are (0;60;20). Random Dictatorship thus leads to the interim utilities
(10;40;40(1   p)) if p < 3=4 and (10;70;10) if p > 3=4. We see that lex coincides
with the random dictatorship outcome if and only if p > 3=4.  is dierent from both
lex and the random dictatorship outcome for any p. In Example 4, if p > 1=3, then
the unique weak sequential equilibrium outcome when the rst individual is the dictator
25Random dictatorship leads to a similar outcome as both lex and  in Example 2.
31leads to the good being traded at the highest possible price - $30 per unit if the reported
type is L, and $50 per unit if the reported type if H - but only a third is traded when
the reported type is H, while the good is traded in full when the reported type is H. If
the second individual is the dictator with p > 1=3, then the good is traded if and only if
the reported type is L. in which case it is traded in full at the lowest possible price - $20
per unit. Random Dictatorship thus leads to the interim utilities (5;5=3;5p), which dier
from both lex and . If p < 1=3, then trade occurs in full independently of the rst
individual's report. The price is $50   20p if the rst individual is the dictator, and $40
if the second individual is the dictator. Random Dictatorship thus leads to the interim
utilities (25   10p;5   10p;5   10p), which coincide with the outcome of both lex and
.
It is a good place to emphasize the strength of I-WELF, as neither , nor the Random
Dictatorship solution, satisfy it. To see that, notice rst that U(F(S)) in Example
4 with p = 4=5 is the convex hull of (0;0;0) and the three vectors shown on Figure
2, i.e. (11:43;0;0), (8;8;0), and (0;0;8). This follows immediately from the previous
characterization of the incentive eciency frontier and the fact that U1(jL)  U1(jH)
at any incentive compatible mechanism (indeed, m1(L)   20x(L)  m1(H)   20x(H) 
m1(H)   40x(H), where the rst inequality follows from the incentive constraint and
the second follows from the fact that x(H) is non-negative). Now, similar computations
would show that the set of interim utilities that can be achieved by mechanisms that
are individually rational and incentive compatible remains unchanged if p is 3=4 instead
of 4=5, the buyer's value in the low type is $92=3 instead of $30, and the buyer's value
in the low type is $44 instead of $50. Yet  will now leads to the interim utilities
(16=3;16=33;136=33) instead of (5;1;21=5), and Random Dictatorship will now prescribe
(11=3;8=9;11=4) instead of (5;5=3;4).26
I conclude this section with directions for future research (in addition to those already
mentioned in the previous paragraphs). First, the most specic, would be to obtain full
characterizations of the interim lex-min solution, either by completing Theorems 1 and 1',
or by adapting other axiomatic characterizations of the egalitarian principle under com-
plete information (see e.g. the axiom of Step-by-Step Decomposition in Kalai (1977), or
of Monotonicity with respect to Changes in the Number of Agents in Thomson (1983a)).
Second, it would be useful to get characterizations of the interim lex-min solution on
more resrictive domains, e.g. the class of quasi-linear social choice problems, and also
to derive I-WELF instead of imposing it (see e.g. de Clippel and Bejan (2009) under
complete information). Third, one would like to get a denition and an axiomatic charac-
terization of the related scale-covariant principle of relative egalitarianism (see e.g. Kalai
and Smorodinsky (1975) for an axiomatic characterization of a similar solution in bar-
gaining theory under complete information, Thomson (1983b), and Sprumont (2009)).
26 leads to the mechanism with x(L) = 1, m(L) = (76=3; 76=3), x(H) = 8=33, and m(H) =
42x(H). If the rst individual is a dictator, then the resulting equilibrium outcome corresponds to the
mechanism with x(L) = 1, m(L) = (92=3; 92=3), x(H) = 4=9, and m(H) = 44x(H). If the second
individual is a dictator, then the resulting equilibrium outcome corresponds to the mechanism with
x(L) = 1, m(L) = (20; 20), x(H) = 0, and m(H) = 0.
32The question here is which reference point to use to dene the relative gains (see also de
Clippel et al. (2010) for a related denition of egalitarian equivalence under incomplete
information). Fourth, one may wish to check whether characterization results derived
in the case of weak Bayesian implementation (requiring that the social planner or the
arbitrator has the ability to focalise the individuals on a specic equilibrium of the mech-
anism he is implementing) also hold for other informational constraints (e.g. full Bayesian
implementation, or strategy-proofness).
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35APPENDIX
Results in this section are variants or reformulations of previous results established by
Myerson (1983, 1984a, 1984b, 1991). It is thus not meant for publication.
Lemma 1 Let (Ti)i2I be nite sets of types, let p be a probability distribution on T =
i2ITi with full support, let v : T ! R, and let u 2 i2IRTi. Then there exists x : T ! R
such that
1. (8t 2 T) :
P
i2I xi(t) = v(t), and
2. (8i 2 I)(8ti 2 Ti) : ui(ti) =
P
t i p(t ijti)xi(t);



























where the rst equality follows from 2, the second equality follows from rearranging
the terms, and the third equality follows 1.
I now prove the converse, assuming for simplicity that
P
t2T p(t)v(t) 6= 0 (a straight-
forward translation argument implies that the result also holds when
P
t2T p(t)v(t) = 0).





t2T p(t)v(t)=p( ti) and u
i: ti
j (tj) = 0, for all (j;tj) 6= (i; ti). The result







can be written as an ane combination of these vectors, and the equations in 1 and 2
are linear in x. So I now dene a function x : T ! RI, and show that it satises the two
sets of equations for ui: ti:




for all t 2 T such that ti 6=  ti, and












36for all t i 2 T i. Equations in 1 and the equations in 2 for any (i;ti) with ti 6=  ti are
trivially satised, by construction. I now check the equations in 2 for any (j;tj) with























where the second equality follows from the denition of  x, and in particular the fact that
 xj( ti;t i) does not depend on t ij. The last expression equals zero, as desired, because
p( tijtj)
p(t j;tj)








t2T p(t)v(t). This combined with what we just
proved implies that
P
t i p(t ij ti)xi(t) =
P
t2T p(t)v(t)=p( ti), as desired. 
Lemma 2 A feasible mechanism  is incentive ecient if and only if there exist  2
i2IR
Ti
+ n f0g and  2 i2IR
TiTi
+ such that
1. (8i 2 I)(8(ti;t0













i (d;t), where the \virtual util-
ity" functions v
(;)





















for each d 2 D, each t 2 T, and each i 2 I.
Proof: The vector  is derived from a classical separation argument, using the fact that
U(F(S)) is closed and convex. The vector  species the dual variables of maximization
of the weighted sum under the incentive constraints. Condition 1 is the usual condition
stating that the dual variable associated to the constaint that individual i should not
pretend to be of type t0
i when being actually of type ti, is positive only if that constraint
is binding. Condition 2 is obtained by rearranging the terms of the Lagrangean (more
details available in Myerson (1991, Chapter 10), for instance). 
Lemma 3 Let A = (aij)1i;jn be a square matrix with non-positive elements o the
diagonal (i.e. aij  0 if i 6= j) and such that the sum of the elements in each column is
strictly positive (i.e.
Pn
i=1 aij > 0, for each j). Then A is invertible.
Proof: Let x 2 Rn be such that Ax = 0. I will prove that x  0. Suppose, on the
























j2J ajk)xk < 0, because
P
j2J ajk > 0, for each
k 2 J, given the assumptions on A. All the coecients of the second term falls o the
diagonal of A and are thus negative, while the corresponding components of x are non-
negative since k 62 J. Hence the second term is non-positive, reaching a contradiction.
This shows that x  0. A similar reasoning implies that x  0, and x must actually be
equal to zero. Hence A is invertible. 
Lemma 4 Let S = (I;D;(Ti)i2I;p;(ui)i2I) be a social choice problem, let  be an in-




+ ) be a pair of vec-
tors that satisfy the conditions of Lemma 2, let j 2 I, let  tj 2 Tj, and let W  = P
i2I
P
ti2Ti i(ti)Ui(jti). Then it is possible to construct a decision ^ d and utility func-
tions (^ ui)i2I dened on (D [ f^ dg)  T such that
1. ^ ui(d;t) = ui(d;t), for each d 2 D, each i 2 I, and each t 2 T;
2.  satises the conditions of Lemma 2 for (;) in ^ S = (I;D[f^ dg;(Ti)i2I;p;(^ ui)i2I);
3. ^ Uj(^ dj tj) = W =j( tj);
4. ^ Uj(^ djt0
j) = 0 if t0
j 2 Tj n ftjg;
5. ^ Ui(^ djti) = 0, for all i 2 N n fjg and all ti 2 Ti.
Proof: Let f : RIT ! RIT be the linear transformation that maps any prole of ex-post



















for each u 2 RIT, each t 2 T, and each i 2 I. Let ^ f : i2IRTi be an analogue

































(8(i;ti) 6= (j; tj)) : ui(ti) = 0;













Lemma 1 implies that there exists x : T ! R such that
1. (8t 2 T) :
P
i2I xi(t) = v(t), and
2. (8i 2 I)(8ti 2 Ti) : vi(ti) =
P
t i p(t ijti)xi(t):
The conditions of the present lemma are then satised if one denes ^ d and the utility
functions such that ui(^ d;t) = (f 1(x))i(t), for all i 2 I and t 2 T. Condition 1 is trivial,
while condition 2 follows from Lemma 3 and the fact that
P
i2I xi(t) = v(t), 8t 2 T. The







 1(x))i(t) = ( ^ f
 1(v))i(ti) = ui(ti);
for each ti 2 Ti and each i 2 I. 
Lemma 5 Let I be a nite set of individuals, let (Ti)i2I be a collection of type sets, let
p 2 (T) be a common prior with full support, let  2 i2IR
Ti
++, and w 2 i2IR
Ti
++. Then
there exists a collective decision di;ti, for each combination (i;ti), and a utility function
ui : fdj;tjjj 2 I;tj 2 Tjg  T ! R, for each i 2 I, such that the following conditions hold
true for each (i;ti):






i) = 0, for all t0
i 2 Ti n f tig;



































Fix i 2 I and  ti 2 Ti. The previous computation implies that the conditions of Lemma
1 are satised for u 2 i2IRTi dened as follows:






(8(j;tj) 6= (i; ti)) : uj(tj) = 0:
Let x : T ! R be a function that satises the two conditions of Lemma 1. It is then easy
to check that the four conditions of the present lemma are satised if one denes di: ti and
the utility functions so that uj(di: ti;t) = p(tj)xj(t)=j(tj), for all tj 2 Tj and all j 2 I. 
40